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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Defendant State of Utah (the "State") adopts plaintiffs'
statement concerning the jurisdiction of this court for review of
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals by a grant of
Plaintiff's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The State accepts and adopts plaintiffs' statement of the
issues.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are believed to be
determinative of the issues presented above:
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 54-4-14 through 15.4
Utah Code Ann. Sees. 63-30-1 through 10
23 U.S.C. § 409
Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
The contents of the cited authority are fully set forth in the
Addendum to this Brief in accord with Rule 24(f), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State adopts plaintiffs' statement of the nature of the
case and incorporates by reference the exceptions and/or supplements to plaintiffs' statement of the course of the proceedings
below made by Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company in its
Brief at pages 2-5, specifically items numbered 1, 2, 4.

In addition, the State makes the following supplement to the
plaintiffs1 and the Railroad's statement of the course of the
proceedings below:
Affidavits submitted by UDOT's Surveillance Team
Plaintiffs suggest that automatic crossing gates had been
recommended by UDOT prior to the Duncan accident but that installation was postponed until Federal funding became available.
This mischaracterizes the actual sequence of events and the
process for obtaining approval for upgrades.

The uncontradicted

affidavit of Ross D. Wilson states that the surveillance team
decided to recommend that gates and signals be installed at the
crossing at such time as federal funding became available and it
was not the intention of the team that approval for upgrading be
sought immediately, or that federal funding be sought for the
Droubay crossing ahead of all other crossings for which the
surveillance team had then recommended improvement, but for which
federal funding had not yet been available.

It was not until

1983, after this accident and after the Federal Highway
Administration standards had been changed, that there was a
sufficiently high accident prediction rate to warrant application
for federal funding.
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Disposition of the Court Below
Plaintiffs assert that the District Judge upheld the State
immunity because the determination as to enhancement of warning
devices was the exercise of a discretionary function, and thus
trivialize the Court's ruling.

The Court did not discuss

"discretionary function" in terms of a simple decision whether
enhance warning devices.

District Judge Hanson actually held

that:
[t]he process is far beyond the perfunctory
decisions that government officials may make
on a day-in and day-out basis, which are not
entitled to protection as discretionary decisions. The process of evaluation involved
here embodies the classic elements of a
discretionary function, to wit: balancing
various needs of differing railroad crossings
throughout the state, weighing competing
interests for available funding, [and]
balancing potential risk versus dollar and
manpower available. (Memorandum Decision,
p.7; R. at 482)
The District Court obviously acknowledged all of the classic
elements of a discretionary function and found them to exist in
this instance.
Plaintiffs also state that Judge Bullock, in writing the
opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, assumed plaintiffs had
stated a prima facie case of negligence.

In footnote 14, Judge

Bullock specifically stated that the court merely presumed for
purposes of argument that plaintiffs had stated a prima facie
case of negligence.

(790 P.2d 600, n.14)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State adopts and incorporates by reference the
corrections and additions to the plaintiffs' Statement of Facts
set forth in the Brief of Union Pacific Railroad at pages 5-12,
with the following supplemental facts:
1.

The three warning signs located on the approach to the

crossing were reflectorized and visible at night from one-half
mile to one mile away depending on whether low-beam or high-beam
lights were used.

(R. at 373). The speed limit on Droubay Road

was 55 m.p.h. (R.431).

At a sight distance of 1/2 to one mile

from the warning signs, and an additional 305 feet to the track,
a vehicle travelling at 55 m.p.h. would have more than ample time
to stop before reaching the track (R.340-343).

These calcula-

tions do not take into consideration the visibility of the
train's headlights and flashing yellow strobe light or the
audible warning of the train's whistle and bell, although the
investigating officer testified by affidavit that tests conducted
on evenings subsequent to the accident indicated that headlights
on westbound trains could be seen for a distance exceeding two
miles, and could be readily observed for several minutes before
trains reached the crossing.
2.

(R.372)

The State inspection team did not recommend in 1981

moving signals from Bauer Road to the Droubay Crossing.

While

the team considered moving signals from the Bauer crossing (which
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had been closed to the public) to the Droubay crossing, inspection of the signals showed them to be outdated substandard, and
moving the old signals would have been almost as expensive as
installing new ones,
3.

(R. 406)

Plaintiffs mischaracterize the approval and funding

process for installation of improved warning devices.

The State

has the responsibility to apportion the costs of active warning
devices at public crossings between railroads and the governmental entities with jurisdiction over the roads.

The devices

are funded 90% from federal funds and 10% from the local entity
with jurisdiction over the road in question.

(R. 407, 408)

Approximately 15% of the 1,373 public at-grade crossings in Utah
have active warning devices.

Federal funding was generally

available for only eight to ten projects each year.

(R. 408)

Thus, the State developed and used a Hazard Index Rating,
approved by the Federal Highway Administration, as one means of
determining the priority of a crossing for upgrading. (R. 408)
The State uses an inspection team which, with railroad and local
government representatives, performs on-site inspections of
crossings throughout the state, using the Hazard Index.

(R. 407)

In 1981 The State surveillance team inspected the Droubay
crossing, applied the Hazard Index Rating system, and found that
the Droubay crossing would not, as compared with other crossings,
qualify for federal funding that year but should be considered
-5-

for federally funded improvement at some time in the future,

(R.

404, 405)
4.

Making determinations regarding the existing, or

predicted, hazards at railroad crossings was only part of the
discretionary function performed by the Utah Department of
Transportation through its crossing inspection and review
process.

(R. 405, 351)

An equally important discretionary

function was an analysis of all inspection team findings in light
of available federal funding to produce a priority list of
crossings where limited federal funds should be used.
405)

(R. 404,

The memorandum of Ross D. Wilson (R. 351), in awareness of

the requirement of establishing priorities, indicated that the
Droubay crossing was not of sufficient priority to qualify for
federal funding.

It was not until 1983, after the subject

accident, using a newly approved FHWA "accident prediction rate"
as an additional factor, that the Droubay crossing reached
sufficient priority to be recommended for federal funding of gate
and signal installation.

(R. 402, 403)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
AT POINT I
The District Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in
holding that the activities engaged in by the State of Utah were
governmental and constituted discretionary functions and as such
are protected by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
-6-

This

decision is in accord with Utah Supreme Court precedent,
legislative intent and sound public policy.
AT POINT II
The recognition of immunity for discretionary functions is
mandated by the Doctrine of Separation of Powers and sound public
policy.
AT POINT III
The immunity issue aside, the District Court and the Court
of Appeals correctly held that the Droubay crossing was not
"extra-hazardous" as a matter of law.

For liability to exist for

a crossing mishap, there must be something about the crossing
that creates a hazard to motorists greater than the inherent
hazard presented by the mere fact that the railroad and the
street intersect at grade.

There are no facts in this case which

support the assertion that the crossing was more than ordinarily
hazardous.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE'S ACTIVITIES COMPLAINED
OF IN THIS ACTION ARE DISCRETIONARY
AND IT IS IMMUNE
Sovereign immunity - the principle that the state cannot be
sued in its own courts without its consent - was a well-settled
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principle of American common law at the time Utah became a state.
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 492-93, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913).
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-1,
et seq., which became effective in 1966, reaffirmed governmental
immunity Mfor any injury which results from the exercise of a
governmental function," subject only to express statutory
waivers, Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Governmental immunity exists if:

(1) the injury resulted

from the exercise of a "governmental function,"1 and (2) immunity
has not been otherwise waived by the Governmental Immunity Act.
Plaintiffs argue that recent cases expand the State's
liability and that the immunity for discretionary functions which
is retained by § 63-30-10(1)(a), is superseded by § 63-30-8, Utah
Code Annotated, which states, in pertinent part:
Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived for
any injury caused by a defective,
unsafe or dangerous condition of
any highway, . . . or other
structure located thereon.
Plaintiffs cite Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah
1985) and Biqelow v. Inqersol, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), for the
proposition that the Utah Supreme Court has held that the express
immunity waiver of § 63-30-8 is not modified by discretionary
defined as activity "of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency or that is essential
to the core of governmental activity," Standiford v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah 1980)
-8-

function immunity provided by § 63-30-10(1)(a).
held.

Neither case so

There is no case which expressly holds that § 63-30-8

stands on its own and is not qualified by § 63-30-10(1)(a), at
least where, as in this case, the claim is premised on merely
negligent conduct of governmental employees.
In Biqelow, the lower court held that the State of Utah was
immune from suit where it was alleged that the state negligently
designed traffic control lights at an intersection where an
automobile collision occurred.

In Biqelow, traffic lights had

been improperly synchronized, resulting in a collision between a
left-turning car in which plaintiffs were passengers and an
oncoming vehicle.

This Court held that although acts of the

state in designing traffic control systems involve some degree of
discretion, the design of this particular system did not involve
the "basic policy making level" so as to render the state immune
from suit.

While this Court discussed the contention that

§ 63-30-8 was not modified by the discretionary function exception of Sub-Section 10, it did not so rule; the issue was never
reached, the court simply holding that the designing of the
improperly synchronized lights was not a discretionary function.
In Richards the plaintiff alleged that a city was negligent
in allowing trees, shrubs, and other growth to obscure vision at
an intersection and that it negligently failed to maintain a stop
sign.

The court held only that maintenance of traffic control
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devices is a governmental function and dismissed plaintiff's
complaint for failure to comply with the Notice requirements of
the Governmental Immunity Act.
Plaintiffs also argue that the State's activities complained
of in this action are "operational" not "policy-making", and
therefore not discretionary, relying on Biqelow, supra, Richards,
supra, and Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982).
However, each of those cases involved the improper design or
maintenance of traffic lights or signs, activities clearly
"operational" and not discretionary.
This case, however, is controlled by Rocky Mountain Thrift
Stores v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988);
and Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 469 P.2d 5 (Utah
1970) .
Velasquez is the seminal case in Utah dealing with the
discretionary power of governmental entities in the installation
of safety devices at railroad crossings.

Velasquez was a

passenger in a pickup truck involved in a crossing collision, and
claimed the State erred in failing to require additional safety
devices at the crossing.

Affirming summary judgment in the

State's favor on immunity grounds, the court found that the
statutory directive prescribing the installation of "appropriate"
safety devices, under Utah Code Ann. Section 54-4-14, indicated a
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legislative intent to confer discretion on the responsible agency
(at that time, the Public Service Commission).

This court held

that the statute gives the state the power to require a different
safety device at the crossing in question, "but that does not
mean that the plaintiff should recover simply because a better
warning signal could or should have been installed."

Id. at 6.

Velasquez remains the law of this State.
In Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660
(Utah 1988), the Court of Appeals outlined the history of the
tests to determine governmental immunity.

Gleave held that the

regulation of public safety needs and the evaluation, installation, maintenance and improvement of safety signals or devices at
railroad crossings is a governmental function, and in light of
that holding went on to discuss whether UDOTfs allegedly negligent failure to install different safety devices at the crossing
in question was a "discretionary function" within the meaning of
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(a).

Holding in the affirmative, the

court noted that the "discretionary function" exception was
"intended to shield those governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways
from individual and class legal actions, the continual threat of
which would make public administration all but impossible."
Gleave, supra, citing Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah
1980).
-11-

The Gleave court applied the analysis2 of Little v. Utah
State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), and
found that the State's decision not to install certain safety
devices at a railroad crossing was a "purely discretionary
function within the meaning of U.C.A. Sec. 63-30-10(1)(a)."
Gleave, supra, at 669.
Applying the Little test, the Court of Appeals held:

First,

the basic governmental objective involved in "installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving" safety devices is the
consistent promotion of public safety, a basic government
objective.

Second, the evaluation of crossings and assignment of

priorities for upgrades is essential to the realization of the
2

(1) Does the questioned act, omission, or
decision necessarily involve a basic
governmental policy, program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or
decision essential to the realization or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or
objective as opposed to one which would not
change the course or direction of the policy,
program, or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision
require the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the
part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved
possess the requisite constitutional,
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do
or make the challenged act, omission, or
decision?

Id. 667 P.2d at 51.
-12-

protection of public safety, especially in light of limited
funds.

Third, UDOT exercises "basic policy evaluation, judgment,

and expertise1' when evaluating railroad crossings for safety
signal improvements and when deciding which crossings should have
upgraded safety appliances first.

In applying UDOT's safety

policy, UDOT's surveillance team performs on-site inspections and
weighs the numerous factors relating to crossing safety.

The

team consists of transportation experts who exercise their
collective judgment and expertise in making their evaluations of
the relative dangerousness of railroad crossings in Utah, taking
into consideration their physical characteristics and configurations, the volume and type of vehicular and train traffic, and
other relevant factors.

Fourth, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 54-4-14 et

seq. (1990) empowers UDOT to supervise and regulate the safety of
all the State's railroad crossings, including the authority to
provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and
improving of safety devices and signals there.

UDOT clearly has

the legal authority to use the monies available for safety signal
improvement at the most dangerous crossings first, which means
that other less dangerous crossings, such as this one, must await
their turn for improvement.
In Rocky Mountain Thrift, supra, the Utah Supreme Court's
most recent decision dealing with discretionary functions,
plaintiffs were owners of commercial properties along North

-13-

Temple Street.

They brought an action against several govern-

mental entities for damages caused by defendants' alleged
negligent mismanagement of flood waters during the 1983 spring
runoff.

The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary

judgment based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Plaintiffs

appealed and this court, while remanding on other grounds, upheld
the trial court's decision that the construction, operation, and
maintenance of the storm system was a governmental function.

In

distinguishing between the operation of a sewer system [which has
been held not to be a governmental function] and the operation of
a storm drain system, the trial court held, and this court
agreed:
The maintenance and operation of a
city-wide storm drainage system may appear
similar to that applied to a city-run sewage
system, but on closer examination they are
quantitatively and qualitatively distinct.
First, operation of a flood control system in
the Salt Lake valley requires a breadth of
coordination that cannot reasonably be
attained by private parties. Further, no
private parties can deal with flood control,
as they might sewage disposal, on an
individual basis. Finally, the immediate
threats posed to life and property by
uncontrolled flooding make such operations
uniquely governmental, almost equivalent to
police and fire protection. This Court
therefore finds that all activities relating
to flood control management in City Creek
Canyon are governmental functions for the
purposes of construing governmental immunity
under the Immunity Act. Rocky Mountain
Thrift, supra, at 462.
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This court then went on to a discussion of whether immunity
had been expressly waived, and the "discretionary function11
exception to any waiver of immunity.

This court again agreed

with the trial court that the design, capacity, and construction
of the City Creek drainage system involved a basic governmental
policy, program, or objective of flood control to protect life
and property, and that defendants' acts and decisions required
the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise:
The design of the City Creek drainage
system is a uniquely discretionary function.
Such design is the product of a balancing of
policy factors including interpretation of
data relevant to climate, rainfall, rates of
erosion, etc., the development of appropriate
design parameters and the economic resources
that a community is willing to devote to a
project providing a necessarily finite degree
of protection. . . . These are precisely the
activities for which waiver of immunity is
denied, Id. at 463.
This Court in Rocky Mountain Thrift applied the analysis
approved in Little, and followed in Gleave, to determine whether
an act or omission was a discretionary function.

Like the

drainage system in Rocky Mountain Thrift, a decision relating to
the improvement of the railroad crossing in this case is a
uniquely discretionary function.

The decisions of the State

relating to upgrading the crossing requires a balancing of policy
factors including interpretation of data relevant to locale,
traffic, accident history, accident prediction, and the evaluation of economic resources that a community is willing to devote
-15-

to a project providing a necessarily finite degree of protection.
These are precisely the types of functions for which immunity
must be retained, as recognized by Rocky Mountain Thrift, Gleave,
and Velasquez.
Velasquez, Gleave, Rocky Mountain Thrift and Duncan all fall
into a category completely distinct from the situations arising
in the cases cited by plaintiffs.

Richards, Bigelow, and Bowen

all involve design or maintenance of traffic signals or signs,
while Velasquez, Gleave, Rocky Mountain Thrift and Duncan all
involve policy decisions dependent on limited funds and based on
numerous factors affecting large numbers of people in a myriad of
unforeseeable ways.

Evaluating all of the approximately 1,373

railroad crossings in the state and assigning priorities for
crossing upgrades is essential to the realization of the protection of public safety, especially in light of the fact that there
are not unlimited funds available to upgrade all needy crossings
at once.

The State has, and must have, discretion to compare

each crossing in the state with all other equally hazardous or
more hazardous crossings for the allocation of limited funds.
This key function goes far beyond mere responsibility for repair
of a fallen or obscured sign.
The activities of the State in prioritizing crossings for
upgraded warning devices are clearly discretionary and the
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immunity provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act protect the
State when it is involved in such activities.
POINT II
IMMUNITY FOR DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTIONS IS MANDATED BY SOUND
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS.
The Utah Supreme Court "has followed the lead of cases
interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act by distinguishing
between those decisions occurring at a broad, policy-making level
and those taking place at the implementing "operational" level."
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).3
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964) and
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act § 63-30-10(I)(a) (1987)
provide nearly identical provisions excepting the government from
liability for injuries arising out of discretionary acts.
Federal courts, in discussing the discretionary functions
protected by the Federal Tort Claims Act, have pointed to the
3

Thus, this court may properly look to decisions of the
Federal Courts which have interpreted the Federal counterpart to
§ 63-30-10, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), particularly as it has been
applied to highway design cases. The following cases have held
activities similar to those here involved to be discretionary,
and the government immune: ARA Leisure Services v. U.S., 831
F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1987)(guardrail); Bowman v. U.S., 820 F.2d
1393 (4th Cir. 1987)(guardrail); Patton v. U.S., 549 F.Supp 36
(W.D. Missouri 1982)(speed limit, design of curve); Miller v.
U.S., 710 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1983) Cert.den., 104 S.Ct. 352
(approval of plans, guardrail, shoulder width, warning signs);
Wright v. U.S., 568 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1977)(location and
construction of bridge and approach roads).
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separation of powers doctrine as a proper foundation for such an
exception to waivers of immunity.
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 97 L.Ed 1427, 73 S.
Ct. 956 (1953) outlined the boundaries of discretionary immunity
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and recognized the separation
of powers doctrine as a basis for the discretionary function
exception.
In following the Dalehite decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the discretionary function exception was plainly
intended to encompass the discretionary acts of the Government
acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private
individuals.
This emphasis upon protection for regulatory
activities suggests an underlying basis for
the inclusion of an exception for discretionary functions in the Act: Congress
wished to prevent judicial "second-guessing11
of legislative and administrative decisions
grounded in social, economic, and political
policy through the medium of an action in
tort. By fashioning an exception for discretionary governmental functions, including
regulatory activities, Congress took "steps
to protect the Government from liability that
would seriously handicap efficient government
operations." (citations omitted)
U.S. v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 104 S.Ct.
2755, 2765 (1984) .
Where the discretionary function provision of the
Governmental Immunity Act conflicts with other provisions of the
Act, the discretionary function provision should control.
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Utah

law calls for a harmonizing of conflicting statutory provisions,
indicating that the provisions "should be considered together and
it is proper to examine into the background and purpose as well
as to the language of the statute to discover what the legislative intent was as to which should have priority."

Worthen v.

Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1967).

This

investigation into background, purpose and intent takes into
consideration the relative weight of the arguments underlying
each of the conflicting statutory provisions.

The discretionary

function provision should be given priority over other more
general provisions.
There has historically been a preference for specific
statutory provisions over general provisions.
Service Com'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988).

Williams v. Public
This court has

discussed statutory construction in terms of the general purposes
statutes are intended to serve:
[Sjtatutes are necessarily stated
in general terms. . . . [0]ften
there is neither the prescience to
foresee, nor sufficient flexibility
of language to cover with exactitude, all of the exigencies of life
which may arise. For this reason
one of the fundamental rules of
statutory construction is that the
statute should be looked at as a
whole and in the light of the
general purpose it was intended to
serve; and should be so interpreted
and applied as to accomplish that
objective. In order to give the
statute the implementation which
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will fulfill its purpose, reason
and intention sometimes prevail
over technically applied
literalness.
Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah 1965).
The discretionary function exception should prevail over
other more general statutory provisions such as § 63-30-8 or
§ 63-30-9 which broadly waive immunity for "any injury" caused by
defective "highways, bridges or other structures" or "public
building, structure, or other public improvement," respectively.
While § 63-30-10(1)(a) in and of itself may not provide greater
specificity than other provisions of the Act, § 63-30-10 with its
elaborate system of waivers for negligence and its detailed set
of exceptions to waiver does provide a more specific statutory
scheme for determination of governmental immunity.
To hold that there is no immunity where the State engaged in
a discretionary function would require judicial second guessing
and would defeat the purpose of the Governmental Immunity Act,
which is to insulate governmental entities from liability for
actions taken for the over-all public good and which require
policy-making rather than operational decisions.

To abrogate

immunity in such circumstances simply because a railroad crossing
is dangerous would require the State to make safe every railroad
crossing in the state, regardless of locale, traffic, accident
history or accident prediction.

Indeed, the only way to insure a
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perfectly "safe" railroad crossing would be to construct an
overpass, a fiscal impossibility.
There is, obviously, a broad spectrum of governmental
activities relating to highways, from repairing chuckholes to
deciding to build multi-lane freeways, to prioritizing the
improving of railroad crossings.

The failure to repair a

chuckhole does not require any policy-making analysis and,
presumably, is not protected by discretionary function immunity.
On the other hand, the decision to build a multi-lane freeway
which would admittedly be "safer" than the existing two-lane
road, requires the balancing of policy factors including
interpretation of data relevant to locale, traffic, accident
history, accident prediction, and allocation of economic
resources; clearly a discretionary act.
The fact that a road, or a railroad crossing, can be made
safer does not make the road or crossing defective.

Every

railroad crossing, by its very nature, is dangerous.4 However, as
the Court of Appeals pointed out,
it is obvious that every railroad crossing is
hazardous, but, since it is not practicable
to eliminate all railroad crossings, the
simple existence of a railroad crossing is
not in itself a breach of a duty of care.
4

"Dangerous" means "exposing to or involving danger; able or
likely to inflict injury." In discussing synonynms, Webster says
"dangerous applies to something that may cause harm or loss
unless dealt with carefully." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary.
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Much of everyday life presents hazards;
driving or walking along a street are
hazardous, and so are stairs, electricity,
and many other things, but we tolerate those
hazards because of the impracticability of
eliminating them.11
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 790 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah
App. 1990).

To hold the UDOT liable in the instant case would

allow judicial second-guessing, with 20-20 hindsight, of
functions entrusted by law to the agency of the executive branch
possessing the requisite expertise - an unwise and unwarranted
breach of the doctrine of separation of powers.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURTS APPROPRIATELY
FOUND THAT THE CROSSING WAS NOT
"EXTRA-HAZARDOUS" AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that
the crossing was not "extra-hazardous" as a matter of law, and
therefore no duty existed to take added precautions.
Plaintiffs argue that the lower courts should have
considered the affidavit of their "expert," Robert Crommelin, who
concluded that the crossing warranted additional safeguards,
specifically automatic crossing gates.
In considering the Statefs Motion for Summary Judgment,
Judge Hanson found that the Crommelin affidavit could not be
considered because it was based on inadmissible evidence and
misinformation; but more importantly, the crossing did not meet
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the Supreme Court test as outlined in Bridges v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co., 488 P.2d 738 (Utah 1971), and followed in Hobbs v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 677 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1984), that
there must be something unusually hazardous about the crossing.
The District court ruled that even if the affidavit were
considered, the case should be dismissed on its merits. The
Court of Appeals addressed the confusion concerning the standard
of care in making railroad crossings safe for motorists to cross.
The confusion arises from the use of the words "more than
ordinarily hazardous," which were used in applying the standard
of care in two Utah cases, Bridges v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,
supra, and English v. Southern Pacific Co./ 13 Utah 407, 45 P.47
(1896) .
These words were never intended to impose a
standard of care higher than ordinary care,
the degree of care exercised by a reasonable
person under the circumstances. . . . In
determining what is reasonable under the
circumstances of a railroad crossing, it is
obvious that every railroad crossing is
hazardous, but, since it is not practicable
to eliminate all railroad crossings, the
simple existence of a railroad crossing is
not in itself a breach of a duty of care. . .
. [T]he question is not whether a hazard
existed, but rather whether, under prevailing
community standards the defendant should bear
the responsibility to discover and ameliorate
a hazard, in light of the practicability of
doing so and the costs and benefits to
society of requiring the defendant so to act.
In the case of railroad crossings, the cost
of eliminating the hazard, such as by
installing overpasses at all railroad
crossings, including rural ones, does not
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warrant a duty of care so rigorous that
simply having a railroad cross a street is
tortious. Rather, for a railroad to be
liable for a crossing mishap, there must be
something about the railroad's right of way
that creates a hazard to motorists greater
than the hazard presented by the simple fact
that the railroad and the street intersect.
Duncan, supra, at 598-599.
The Bridges court held that "there must be evidence to
indicate that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous,
i.e., there must be something in the configuration of the land,
or in the construction of the railroad, or in the structures in
the vicinity, or in the nature or amount of the travel on the
highway, or in other conditions, which renders the warning
employed at the crossings inadequate to warn the public of
danger."

488 P.2d at 739.

The kinds of obstructions, traffic problems and "other
conditions" which might render a crossing extra-hazardous are
described in earlier cases decided by this Court.

In Pippy v.

Oregon Short Line R.R., 11 P.2d 305 (Utah 1932) and Toomer's
Estate v. Union Pacific R.R., 239 P.2d 163 (Utah 1951), the
crossings were found to be more than ordinarily hazardous because
(1) the railroads had created obstructions to view of the oncoming trains on an adjacent track right up next to the crossing;
(2) there were electrical signals present at the crossings which
the drivers relied upon and which failed to work; (3) the trains
were speeding greatly in excess of a city-imposed speed limit;
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(4) there was excessive noise being emitted by adjacent railroad
operations which tended to drown out any warning signals being
emitted by the oncoming train; and (5) there were other circumstances which the courts held tended to confuse the motorist into
thinking it was safe to cross when it was not, or made it
impossible for the drivers to safely make such a determination.
The determination of whether a crossing is extra-hazardous
is, in the appropriate case, initially for the Court to make as a
matter of law.

In Bridges it was noted that the Court may

"authorize" a jury to consider the extra-hazardous crossing issue
only after the court first determines that there is probative,
admissible evidence showing the existence of such a crossing.

If

the Court concludes that there is no such evidence, it may rule
that the crossing is not more than ordinarily hazardous as a
matter of law.

Id. at 488 P.2d 739. After reviewing the file,

Judge Hanson found that the photos and investigating officer's
tests and observations all showed that the surrounding land in
the area of the automobile's approach was flat, at least to the
extent that approaching trains can be readily seen and observed
by the driver of an automobile.

There are no buildings or other

structures in the area to divert a driver's attention, or to
otherwise confuse.

There are no lights or unusual noises to

confuse or deceive an otherwise unsuspecting driver.

There was

nothing about the crossing that could provide notice to UDOT
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personnel that the warnings which were there at the time of the
accident were not adequate to warn the public.

"While any

railroad crossing can be hazardous, it is hard to imagine a
crossing that presents a smaller hazard than the one in question
before the Court."

(Memorandum Decision at pages 10-11; R. 478-

479) .
The Crommelin Affidavit cannot properly be considered as
probative evidence because it relies upon both false and inadmissible "facts" in reaching the conclusion that the crossing was
extra-hazardous.
Crommelin relied on demonstratably false "fact" that "as
many as 1,500 vehicles traversed the railroad crossing per day"
(R. 189). The UDOT records clearly show that the 1,500 vehicles
per day number was only an "expected" anticipated increase which
never materialized.

The actual count that Crommelin should have

relied upon, as more specifically set forth in the Statement of
Facts, was only 580 vehicles per day.5
The unreliability (and hence the inadmissibility) of the
Crommelin Affidavit is underscored by its assertion that the
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices mandates that the
railroad advance warning sign be placed at least 750 feet away

Vehicular traffic volume is one of the key factors used in
the Hazard Index.
-26-

from the crossing.

The MUTCD neither mandates nor requires such

sign placement.
While § 8B-3 of the Manual provides that such a sign is
"normally" 750 feet or more in advance of the crossing in rural
areas, that same section also states that placement of such a
sign shall be in accordance with § 2C-3, which only suggests that
in rural areas "warning signs should normally be placed about 750
feet in advance of the hazard or conditions/1 and goes on to note
that warning signs may be placed as far as 1500 feet or as close
as 250 feet depending upon the nature of the locale and the
prevailing speeds.

Section 2C-3 further provides:

The actual advance warning distance will be
determined by two factors, the prevailing
speed and the prevailing condition. These
bear respectively on the time available to
the driver to comprehend and react to the
message, and the time needed by him to
perform any necessary maneuver.
It should also be noted that the table found in § 2C-3
titled "a guide for advance warning sign placement distance"
provides for distances for warning signs in areas where the
posted speed is 55 miles per hour to be anywhere between 700 and
300 feet, with 450 suggested if it may be necessary for the
driver to stop.
Implicit throughout the entire MUTCD is the notion that,
while the manual provides standards and guidelines, it is not a
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substitute for engineering judgment.

One of the preliminary

sections, § 1A-4, states that:
The decision to use a particular device at a
particular location should be made on the
basis of an engineering study of the
location. Thus, while this manual provides
standards for design and application of
traffic control devices, the manual is not a
substitute for engineering judgment. It is
the intent that the provisions of this manual
be standards for traffic control devices
installation, but not a legal requirement for
installation.
Section 1A-5 also defines the words "shall" and "should."
"Shall" means a mandatory condition whereas the word "should"
means an "advisable usage, recommended but not mandatory."

A

review of the manual as it relates to the placement of the
railroad crossing advance warning signs nowhere uses the word
"shall," but only the word "should" and thus, at least as to
distances that such signs are to be located in advance of the
railroad crossing, there is no mandatory minimum distance.
Last but not least, Section 2C-3 provides that "the
effectiveness of the placement of any warning sign should be
tested periodically under both day and night conditions."

In

this case it is uncontradicted that, within a few days after the
subject accident, the highway patrol undertook a nighttime
evaluation of the crossing and the signs, including the advance
warning sign and the crossbucks, and found them clearly visible
at one mile away if the vehicles lights were on high beam.
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With

the lights on low beam, all of the signs were clearly visible
one-half mile away (2640 feet) or more than three times the 750
foot distance which the Crommelin Affidavit claims the manual
"mandated."

There is, of course, nothing in the record to

indicate that the driver of the plaintiff's vehicle should not
have had his lights on high beam; if he had, he would have had a
clear view of not only the advance warning sign, but also the
crossbucks and the crossing itself at a distance seven times
greater the 750 foot "minimum."

Also, the stopping tests

performed by the Highway Patrol clearly show that the lesser
distance of 305 feet was more than adequate for reaction time and
maneuvering to stop a vehicle travelling at 55 m.p.h.
Further, as noted by the District Court at p.9 of its
Memorandum Decision (R. 450), placement of the sign at 305 feet
as opposed to 750 feet could not possibly have been a proximate
cause of the accident, because the undisputed facts show that
plaintiffs totally ignored the warning signs which were clearly
and readily noticeable at a distance of up to one mile (5,280
feet) away from the crossing.

Plaintiffs offer no explanation of

how placement of the advance warning sign an additional few hundred feet away from the crossing would have made any difference
with respect to how the accident vehicle was operated as it
approached the crossing.
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Crommelin's reliance on the other accidents occuring at the
crossing is also in error.

Each of the accidents was totally

dissimilar in its surrounding circumstances.

Accordingly, if

Crommelin's conclusion was based in any material degree on such
an erroneous assumption, the conclusion is without proper
foundation, and therefore, inadmissible.
In addition to the above described misstatements of
foundational facts, the affidavit also improperly relies upon
evidence which is statutorily inadmissible pursuant to 23 U.S.C.
§ 409 (Addendum).

The obvious public policy intent of 23 U.S.C.

§ 409 is to promote candor between governmental officials and
railroads regarding applications submitted by state and local
governments for federal funds to enhance safety at railroad grade
crossings.

If highway officials and railroads must be concerned

that information included in applications for federal funds will
be used against them as "admissions" in damage suits based upon
accidents at such crossings, such officials will be inhibited in
making any such statements or applications or in preparing the
underlying data used by the federal officials in passing upon
such applications.
The use of the phrase "for any purpose" in 23 U.S.C. § 409
precludes the use of such reports by expert witnesses.

In view

of the remedial purpose for which the section was enacted, it
would be extremely prejudicial to allow a party to get into
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evidence through the "back door" of an expert's opinion what the
statute prohibits from coming in as direct, factual evidence.
The Crommelin Affidavit relies, albeit erroneously, upon the
UDOT reports in concluding that the crossing is extra-hazardous.
There is no question that the UDOT reports reflect the results of
an investigation which was undertaken to determine the appropriateness and feasibility of installing additional crossing warning
devices through use of available federal funding.

Accordingly,

neither the reports nor any of the data contained therein can be
relied upon either by way of evidence or argument, to support the
contention that the crossing was extra-hazardous or that either
of the defendants was negligent in failing to upgrade the
crossing devices.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the decisions of Judge Hanson
and the Utah Court of Appeals granting summary judgment to the
State of Utah should be affirmed.

As a matter of law, the cross-

ing in question is not extra-hazardous.

The Statefs activity was

exclusively governmental and its decisions discretionary.

The

responsibility of the State to study and compare various railroad
crossings and prioritize them for improvement is a discretionary
activity and entitled to the protection of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
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ADDENDUM

23 U . S . C .
§ 4 0 9 . Admission as evidence of certain reports and surveys
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys,
schedules, lists, or data compiled for the purpose of identifying1
evaluating, or planning the safety enhancement of potential accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or railway-highway crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 152 of this title or for the
purpose of developing any highway safety construction improvement project which may be implemented utilizing Federal-aid highway funds shall not be admitted into evidence in Federal or State
court or considered for other purposes in any action for damages
arising from any occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed
in such reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data.
(Added Pub.L. 100-17, Title I, § 132(a), Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 170.)
1

Probably should have a comma inserted.
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U.S.C.

§ 2680.

Exceptions

The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
not apply to—
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.

54-4-14. Safety regulation.
The commission shall have power, by general or special orders, rules or
regulations, or otherwise, to require every public utility to construct, maintain and operate its line, plant, system, equipment, apparatus, tracks and
premises in such manner as to promote and safeguard the health and safety of
its employees, passengers, customers and the public, and to this end to prescribe, among other things, the installation, use, maintenance and operation
of appropriate safety or other devices or appliances including interlocking and
other protective devices at grade crossings or junctions, and block or other
system of signaling, and to establish uniform or other standards of construction and equipment, and to require the performance of any other acts which
the health or safety of its employees, passengers, customers or the public may
demand, provided, however, that the department of transportation shall have
jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of
Transportation Act.

54-4-15, Establishment and regulation of grade crossings.
(1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a public road, highway or street at grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be
constructed across the track of any other railroad or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the track of a street railroad corporation be constructed across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, without the permission of the Department of Transportation having first been secured; provided, that this subsection shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully
existing tracks. The department shall have the right to refuse its permission
or to grant it upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe.
(2) The department shall have the power to determine and prescribe the
manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a
railroad and of each crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad or
street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or
abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain types
of traffic in the interest of public safety and is vested with power and it shall
be its duty to designate the railroad crossings to be traversed by school buses
and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and to require, where in its
judgment it would be practicable, a sepairation of grades at any such crossing
heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe the terms upon which
such separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the
alteration or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such grades shall
be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or
between such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other public
authority in interest.
(3) Whenever the department shall find that public convenience and necessity demand the establishment, creation or construction of a crossing of a
street or highway over, under or upon the tracks or lines of any public utility,
the department may by order, decision, rule or decree require the establishment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall thereupon become a public highway and crossing.
(4) The commission shall retain exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of
any dispute upon petition by any person aggrieved by any action of the department pursuant to this section.

54-4-15.1. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Duty to
provide.
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall
as prescribed m this act provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstructmg, and improving of automatic and other safety appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks of any
railroad or street railroad corporation in the state.

54-4-15.2. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Funds
for payment of costs.
The funds provided by the state for purposes of this act shall be used in
conjunction with other available moneys, including those received from federal sources, to pay all or part of the cost of the installation, maintenance,
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in Section
54-4-15.1 at any grade crossing of a public highway or any road over the
tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in this state.

54-4-15.3. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Apportionment of costs.
The Department of Transportation, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 54-4-15, shall apportion the cost of the installation, maintenance,
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in Section
54-4-15.1 between the railroad or street railroad and the public agency involved. Unless otherwise ordered by the department, the liability of cities,
towns and counties to pay the share of maintenance cost assigned to the local
agencies by the department shall be limited to the funds provided under this
act. Payment of any moneys from the funds provided shall be made on the
basis of verified claims filed with the Department of Transportation by the
railroad or street railroad corporation responsible for the physical installation, maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of the signal or device.

54-4-15.4. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Provision of costs.
The Department of Transportation shall provide in its annual budget for
the costs to be incurred under this act.

63-30-1. Short title.
ms act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Governmental
Immunity Act."

63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a comminsion, or members of
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent
contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or,
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a con* governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential *
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
<b> A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) 'Injury'^means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property
damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(91 "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and prnvprnrnp^tfll pnti.

63-30-4, Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity —
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury ^
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such *
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority,
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or
malice.

63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligationsImmunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights f ° M ^ ^
not be subject to the requirements of Section 63-30-11, 63-30-12, M-<5U-l<Sf
63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19.

63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery
of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any
adverse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or
other lien said entity may have or claim on the property involved.

63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this section shall
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14.

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road,
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other
structure located thereon.

63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or
defective public building, structure, or other
public improvement — Exception.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury
caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for
latent defective conditions.

63-30-10, Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions —
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990],
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
civil rights; or
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it
is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment
of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(1) arises out of the activities of:
(i) providing emergency medical assistance;
(ii) fighting fire;
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or
hazardous waste; or
(iv) emergency evacuations; or
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or
seeding for the clearing of fog.
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights.
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of
fourth amendment rights.

1A-4

Engineering Study Required

The decision to use a particular device at a particular location should be
made on the basis of an engineering study of the location. Thus, while this
Manual provides standards for design and application of traffic control
devices, the Manual is not a substitute for engineering judgment. It is the
intent that the provisions of this Manual be standards for traffic control
devices installation, but not a legal requirement for installation.
Qualified engineers are needed to exercise the engineering judgment
inherent in the selection of traffic control devices, just as they are needed
to locate and design the roads and streets which the devices complement.
Jurisdictions with responsibility for traffic control, that do not have
qualified engineers on their staffs, should seek assistance from the State
highway department, their county, a nearby large city, or a traffic
consultant.

1A-5

Meanings of "Shall," "Should" and "May"

In the Manual sections dealing with the design and application of traffic
control devices, the words "shall," "should" and "may" are used to
describe specific conditions concerning these devices. To clarify the
meanings intended in this manual by the use of these words, the following
definitions apply:
1. SHALL-a mandatory condition. Where certain requirements in the
design or application of the device are described with the "shall"
stipulation, it is mandatory when an installation is made that these
requirements be met.
2. SHOULD-an advisory condition. Where the word "should" is used,
it is considered to be advisable usage, recommended but not mandatory.
3. MAY-a permissive
application is intended.

condition. No requirement for design or

8B-3 Railroad Advance Warning Signs (W10-1, 2, 3, 4)
A Railroad Advance Warning (W10-1) sign shall be used on each roadway in advance of every grade crossing except:
1. On low-volume, low-speed roadways crossing minor spurs or other
tracks that are infrequently used and which are flagged by train crews.
2. In the business districts of urban areas where active grade crossing
traffic control devices are in use.
3. Where physical conditions do not permit even a partially effective
display of the sign.
Placement of the sign shall be in accordance with Table II-1, Section
2C-3 and Sections 2A-21 to 2A-27, except in residential or business
districts where low speeds are prevalent, the signs may be placed a
minimum distance of 100 feet from the crossing. On divided highways and
one-way roads, it is desirable to erect an additional sign on the left side of
the roadway.
The W10-2, 3, and 4 signs may be installed on highways that are parallel
to railroads. The purpose of these signs is to warn a motorist making a
turn that a railroad crossing is ahead. Where there is 100 feet or more
between the railroad and the parallel highway, a W10-1 sign should be installed in advance of the railroad crossing and the W10-2, 3, or 4 signs on
the parallel highway would not be necessary.

VIH-12 (c)
Rev. 5

W10-1
36" Diameter

vm-2(c)
Rev 2

W10-2

W10-3

W10-4

30" X 30"

30" x 30"

30" x 30"

2C-3

Placement of Warning Signs

Warning signs shall be erected in accordance with the general
requirements for sign position as described in Section 2A-21 to 29.
Since warning signs are primarily for the benefit of the driver who is
unacquainted with the road, it is very important that care be given to the
placement of such signs. Warning signs should provide adequate time for
the driver to perceive, identify, decide, and perform any necessary
maneuver. This total time to perceive and complete a reaction to a sign is
the sum of the times necessary for Perception, Identification/understanding, Emotion f decisionmaking, and Volition/execution of decision,
and is here referred to as the PIEV time. The PIEV time can vary from
about 3 seconds for general warning signs to 10 seconds for high driver
judgment condition warning signs. Table II-l lists suggested minimum
sign placement distances that may be used for three conditions:

TABLE II-1—A Guide For Advance Warning Sign Placement Distance1
Condition
Posted or
85 percentile
speed MPH

70
25

to.
35
40
45
50
55
60
65

A high
judgment
needed J
(10 sees.
PIEV/
5

175
250
325
400
475
550
625
700
775
850

General warning signs*
Condition
Condition C—Deceleration condition to listed
B—Stop
advisory speed— MPH (or desired speed at condition)
condition ~~
10
30
50
20
40
0
2
5

100
150
225
300
375
450
550
650

O

100
150
200
275
350
425
500
575
650

5

100 .
175 .
250
300
400
475
550
625

5

175 .
250 .
325
400
500
575

'225
300
400
500

s
5

300
375

Typical Signs for the Listed Conditions in Taole II-1, Condition A—Merge Right Lane Ends, etc, Condition B—Cross
Road. Stop Ahead Signal Ahead, Ped-Xing, etc , Condition C—Turn, Curve, Divided Road, Hill, Dip, etc
1 Distances shown are tor level roadwavs Corrections should be made for grades If 48-mch signs are used, the legibility
distance mav be increased to 200 feet This would allow reducing the above distance by 75 feet
2 In urban areas, a supplementary plate underneath the warning sign should be used specifying the distance to the
condition if there is an in between intersection which might confuse the motorist
3 Distance provides for 3-second P!E\, 125 feet Sign Legibility Distance, Braking Distance for Condition B and
Comfortable Braking Distance for condition C as indicated in A Policvon Geometric Design of Highways and Streets. 1984,
AASHTO. Figure 11-13
4 No suggested minimum distance provided At these speeds, sign location depends on physical conditions at site
5 Feet

Condition A—a higher driver judgment condition which requires the
driver to use extra time in making and executing a decision because of a
complex driving situation; i.e., lane changing, passing, or merging.
Condition B—a condition in which the driver will likely be required to
stop; and Condition C—a condition in which the driver will likely be
required to decelerate to a specific speed. The table is provided as an aid
for determining warning sign location. The values contained in the table
are for guidance purposes and should be applied with engineering
judgment. The placement of temporary warning signs used at highway
construction and maintenance sites is covered in Part VI of this Manual
and the suggested minimum sign placement distances given in Table II-1
may not apply to that group of signs.
Other miscellaneous warning signs that advise of potential hazards not
related to a specific location may be installed in the most appropriate
locations since they are not covered in Table II-1. These include DEER
CROSSING and SOFT SHOULDER signs. Minimum spacing between
warning signs with different messages normally should be based on the
PIEV times for driver comprehension and reaction.
The effectiveness of the placement of any warning sign should be tested
periodically under both day and night conditions. Figure 2-5 (page 2A-17)
shows typical installations of standard warning signs.
2C-4 Turn Sign (Wl-1)
The Turn sign (W1-1R or 1L) is intended for use where engineering
investigations of roadway, geometric, and operating conditions show the

Rule 56

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(fi When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.

